One of the core issues (if not the core issue) in analytical sociology is the investigation of the micro-macro link in social phenomena (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998 , Hedström, 2005 . Analytical sociology endorses a social mechanism-based type of explanation according to which causal relationships between social phenomena at the macro-level are explained through the patterns of individuals' action and interaction at the micro-level. This explanatory scheme is clearly illustrated by the concatenation of a number of causal mechanisms encoded in the so-called Coleman's boat (Coleman, 1990) . In Coleman's architecture, the first causal mechanisms bridging a certain macro-level phenomenon X (the explanans) with the relevant underlying micro-level processes are situational mechanisms, through which social structures constrain individuals' action and cultural settings shape individuals' motives and dispositions (desires, beliefs etc.). Subsequently, individuals develop their action and interaction at the micro-level through some action-formation mechanisms, typically understood as operating on an informal social network, in which network actors are the implicated individuals and network ties correspond to patterns of deployed interactions. Finally, the individuals' social network is lifted onto the macro-level through some transformational mechanisms, which generate various intended and unintended social outcomes identifying a certain social phenomenon Y (the explanandum). In summary, according to the typology of Coleman's boat, the causal macro-level association of the explanans social phenomenon X with the explanandum social phenomenon Y is established through the concatenation of three
subsequently it was explored analytically in the seminal work of Ronald Breiger (1974) . Therefore, what we consider here to be an action-formation mechanism is the mechanism of network affiliation duality, with the understanding that the affiliation of persons into groups was produced by the previous mechanism that had carried out the distribution of attributes on persons (with technical details about the formal operationalization of this mechanism to be described in the next section). Finally, the transformational mechanism that assembles groups into communities (of groups) is considered to be the mechanism of the emergence of clusters (of both modes) in an affiliation network with attitudinal actors (to be formally clarified in the following two sections). Thus, the overall architecture of social mechanisms that we are going to attend to here in order to explain the macro-or meso-level association of attributes with communities is given in the following figure. Having described the social mechanisms called up in our analysis of the causal relationship between attributes and communities, we need to further expound these two notions. First, in what concerns the former, as it will become clear in next section from the point of view of the formal structural methodology that we going to follow, the interference of attributes occurs in two different ways in this mechanism-based causal typology. The first instance is when attributes are conceived as patterns of affiliations that actors happen to have within certain prescribed groupings (of actors).
The second instance is when attributes are construed as patterns of attitudes that actors may exhibit in their transactions. In both instances, attributes operate formally as monadic (not dyadic) actors' characteristics and, thence, the choice of two-mode networks in our analysis (not to mention the scarcity of empirical data sets of onemode networks, in which actors display a variety of attitudes). However, this is not just a trivial formal simplification that we are obliged to adopt in order to reduce the complexity of the studied network. Substantively, one may evoke what the anthropologist Siegfried Frederick Nadel (1957) used to argue in the past, i.e., "membership roles" correspond completely to "relational roles," a consequence of which is Ronald Breiger's commitment to talk about "two types of social ties: membership and social-relations" (Breiger, 1974, p. 183) .
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Coming to the notion of communities, we need to stress from the beginning that we are concerned with the relational meaning of the term. Leaving aside technical details (to be discussed in the last two section), what in principle one understands as "community detection" in a social network (with either one-or two-modes) is a partition of the set of actors in certain tight-knit subsets of actors, called communities (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 249) . In other words, actors inside a community should be relatively more densely connected to each other than how (relatively sparsely) actors among different communities were connected. Undoubtedly, to say to which community a social network actor belongs is a type of a group or collective categorization. In any case, a community categorization has 
Affiliation Networks
Typically, in social network analysis, a two-mode network is a social network comprising two sets of actors (called modes) and being endowed with ties only between the two modes (no ties inside a mode). Furthermore, in social network analysis, a particular type of two-mode networks arises when there is a certain inhomogeneity between the two modes. This is the case when the first mode of actors consists of proper individual actors (i.e., actors being individuals or persons) and the second mode represents either collective actors (like groups or organizations) or situations (like events or meetings) to which actors of the first mode belong (either as members of groups or organizations or as participants to events or meetings). Such a two-mode network is usually called an affiliation network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, pp. 29-30) . Now, if, in a social network, there was no predefined (prescribed) differentiation among actors, in the sense that all actors were in a single mode and any actor could possibly form a tie with any other one, then such a social network could be also called Remarkably, the "mixing" of "affiliational" attributes (organizations) and (actors') attitudes in the community partitioning of the 8 IPPS countries appears to be very low.
In 3 countries (Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands), there are no communities, which include both organizations and actors' (respondents') attitudes. This means that, in these three countries, none of the organizations happens to be tight-knit with none of the attitudes. In other 4 countries (Italy, Switzerland, Spain and UK), there is a single community that happens to include both organizations and attitudes. Only in the USA, the mixing is relatively high, as there are three communities with both organizational and attitudinal membership. Thus, given that segregation is the opposite of mixing, what the 8 national IPPS community analyses show is that the macro-link of attributional diversity with community segregation is not locally uniform. Of course, incorporating other (cultural and political) variables into the data set that we have analyzed here could possibly result different patterns of segregationmixing across national "localities." However, in this way, although the considered constituencies in organizations and attitudes might have changed, the same mechanism-based analytic methodology that we have developed here would still apply. Methodological mechanism-based universality is one of the virtues of analytical sociology when compared to the parochialism of many approaches of current sociology.
